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Abstract. Malicious document files used in targeted attacks often con-
tain a small program called shellcode. It is often hard to prepare a
runnable environment for dynamic analysis of these document files be-
cause they exploit specific vulnerabilities. In these cases, it is necessary
to identify the position of the shellcode in each document file to ana-
lyze it. If the exploit code uses executable scripts such as JavaScript and
Flash, it is not so hard to locate the shellcode. On the other hand, it
is sometimes almost impossible to locate the shellcode when it does not
contain any JavaScript or Flash but consists of native x86 code only.
Binary fragment classification is often applied to visualize the location of
regions of interest, and shellcode must contain at least a small fragment
of x86 native code even if most of it is obfuscated, such as, a decoder
for the obfuscated body of the shellcode. In this paper, we propose a
novel method, o-glasses, to visualize the shellcode by recognizing the
x86 native code using a specially designed one-dimensional convolutional
neural network (1d-CNN). The fragment size needs to be as small as the
minimum size of the x86 native code in the whole shellcode. Our results
show that a 16-instruction-sequence (approximately 48 bytes on average)
is sufficient for the code fragment visualization. Our method, o-glasses
(1d-CNN), outperforms other methods in that it recognizes x86 native
code with a surprisingly high F-measure rate (about 99.95%).
Binary fragment classification, shellcode, visualization, CNN, MLP
1 Introduction
In recent years, targeted attacks have become a major threat. In a targeted
email attack, an email contains a request to open an attached file or click on
a hyperlink in the email body. If the recipient does so, then some malware is
launched. Most such malware is newly crafted, unknown malware, and is thus
often hard for antivirus scanners to catch. In particular, malicious document files
used in targeted email attacks often contain an executable file embedded within
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Fig. 1. Typical structure and execution process of a malicious document
a decoy document file: over 60% of the attached files in targeted email attacks
occurring in 2014 were reported to be document files [1].
The left-hand side of Fig. 1 shows a typical structure for a malicious doc-
ument file. The malicious document file consists of four parts: exploit code,
shellcode, an executable file, and a decoy document file. Exploit code is a pro-
gram designed to exploit a document processor vulnerability. The exploit code
is executed when the malicious document file is opened, leading to execution of
the shellcode. Shellcode is a program designed to create an executable file and
a decoy document from the remainder of the file and to launch the executable.
Then, the PC that opened the malicious document file becomes controllable by
attackers. The right-hand side of Fig. 1 shows a typical execution process of a
malicious document file.
To reach attackers’ information, we should not only detect the malware but
also figure out the features of the malware in detail. Here, we face several prob-
lems. First, we should prepare a runnable condition for the malware in order
to conduct dynamic analysis. When the target file is a malicious document ex-
ploiting specific vulnerabilities, it is often difficult to prepare the activatable
environment (OS versions, browsing software, language, patches, and so on)
because the conditions are complicatedly intertwined. Therefore, we are often
forced to conduct static analysis. When the target file is an executable file, it
is easy to find the entry point for analysis. However, when the target file is a
document file, it is not so easy to find the entry point. In this case, we focus
on the shellcode executed after exploit code. When the malware uses JavaScript
or Flash, we can figure out the location of the shellcode quickly. However, ex-
ploit code uses not only JavaScript and Flash but also font and image files, for
example, a TIFF image (CVE-2017-5133 [2,3], CVE-2004-1308 [4]), a jpeg2000
image (CVE-2016-8332 [5,6]), and a TrueType font (CVE-2011-3402 [7]). When
searching for shellcode, it is important to consider various types of exploit code.
Thus, our target is a class of malicious document files that contain x86 native
code hidden somewhere in them.
Although attackers tend to use obfuscation to protect their code, shellcode
must contain at least a small fragment of x86 native code, such as a decoder.
Fig. 2. An example of a small decoder with a 29-byte sequence. It contains only
17 opcodes, and it decodes the body of the shellcode with 1-byte-key xor encoding.
(“0xCC” in this example)
Fig. 2 shows an example of a small decoder containing 17 opcodes in only a
29-byte sequence. This code was obtained from a malicious document file with a
size of more than 100kB used in a real attack. Our challenge, therefore, is finding
a small amount of code like that shown in Fig. 2 in often large document files. To
do this, we introduce a novel method, called o-glasses, to visualize the shellcode
by recognizing the x86 native code using a specially designed one-dimensional
convolutional neural network (1d-CNN).
In summary, the main contributions of our approach are as follows:
1.1 Easily Collectible Training Datasets
One of the most significant problems in using machine learning is how to pre-
pare the training dataset. Even an excellent model cannot demonstrate its per-
formance without large samples. However, studies of malware using machine
learning sometimes struggle to collect samples because they need examples of
malware for training. In contrast, our approach does not need malware for the
training dataset. Thus, samples for learning are easily available for anyone.
1.2 High Recognition Rate for x86 Code
Conventional signature-based malware detectors do not work when an unknown
code is embedded. On the other hand, program code is not supposed to be in
document files. So, extracting shellcode from malicious document files becomes a
reality if we can separate program code precisely from normal byte sequences in
document files. The solution provided in this paper is based on the assumption
that shellcode and general program code have similar distributions of code.
1.3 Visual Analysis for Supporting Analysts
Visualizing a binary as an image helps to quickly get an overview of the file. While
some experienced analysts can deduce the location of the embedded program
code from a grayscale image converted from the binary file, even unexperienced
analysts can achieve similar results using our proposed methods.
2 Preliminaries
The proposed solution lies in the static analysis of files. We do not take into
account the file structure. The only thing of importance for us is whether a file
fragment is a piece of x86 code.
2.1 x86 Architecture
The x86 and x86-64 architectures are probably the most widely used CISC (Com-
plex Instruction-Set Computing) architectures [8]. Their instruction sets are rich
and complex, and most importantly they support instructions of varying length.
Instruction lengths range from just one byte (i.e., instructions comprising just a
one-byte opcode) to 15 bytes.
2.2 Assumptions
We made the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The distribution of the byte sequence from x86 code is dissimilar
to that from document files.
Assumption 2 The distribution of shellcode is the same as that of common x86
code.
In other words, we expect to be able to detect shellcode by detecting any x86
code.
We next describe Shannon entropy, conventional visualization methods, and
the deep learning models (multi-layer perceptron [MLP] and CNN) used in the
study.
2.3 Shannon Entropy
We calculate the information entropy of each file fragment using the Shannon
entropy rate given by
H(X) = −1
8
255∑
i=0
P (X = i) log2 P (X = i), (1)
where X is a random variable over [0, 255]. The entropy rates are real numbers
between 0 and 1, where 1 means the file fragment is uniformly random.
2.4 Conventional Visualization Methods
Visualizing a binary as an image is very helpful for getting a quick overview of
the file. In this section, we describe the three conventional visualization methods.
Grayscale A technique for representing different files with grayscale images was
introduced by Conti et al. [9] and was applied to automatic malware classification
by Nataraj et al. [10].
Bit-image representation of a binary file Goto [11] implemented the vi-
sualization of a binary file as a “bit-image” in a hex editor named “Stirling” in
1998. In Stirling, a given binary is read as a vector of 8-bit unsigned integers
and then organized into a two-dimensional array. This can be visualized as a
bit-image in four colors: 0x00 (null) in white, 0x01-0x1F (control characters) in
light blue, 0x20-0x7F (ASCII) in red, and 0x80-0xFF in black.
Structural entropy Document files contain data of various kinds: metadata,
text, and packed data. All of these file areas differ not only in size but also in
the level of information entropy. When a document file may be considered as
a system of such elements, then we can use the term structural entropy for its
characterization. Sorokin [12] built entropy diagrams by using the sliding window
method. He selected 256 bytes for the window (block) size and 128 bytes for the
window (block) shift. In our experiment, we used the same block size but changed
the block shift to 1 byte to provide more detail. We calculate entropy level at
each offset and visualize the structural entropy as a grayscale image.
2.5 MLP
A standard MLP neural network has a three-tier structure: the input layer, the
hidden layers, and the output layer. Every layer in an MLP consists of nodes
fully connected with the nodes in the adjacent layer.
Fig. 3. Schematic diagrams of a CNN and an MLP
2.6 CNN
In our method for recognizing x86 native code, we use a 1dCNN [13]. In contrast
to an MLP, a CNN has limited connections between each layer (see Fig. 3) and
nodes in an intermediate layer receive only input from a localized part of the
previous layer, which is called the receptive field.
Tools based on CNNs have now led to great results in a wide range of vision
tasks [14]. Generally, image data are continuous data. So, when image data are
input to a CNN, high object recognition power can be obtained by adjusting
the CNN’s local receptive field. On the other hand, program code is classified
as discrete data when viewed one byte at a time. Therefore, when binary data
directly converted into an image are input to a CNN, there is the possibility that
the benefit of the local receptive field cannot be obtained. On the other hand,
program code is a sequence of instructions, which may reduce the variation, so
the possibility of receiving the benefit of the CNN’s local receptive field is not
entirely ruled out.
Weight sharing is a mechanism in which all links to nodes of a local receptive
field have the same weight. In the case of Fig. 3, the three blue links have the
same weight. Similarly, the three red links have the same weight. By using the
local receptive field in this way, the result for some input data is the same as the
result for shifted input data. This allows us to reflect all the data in intermediate
layers despite the limited connectivity to the input.
Several hyperparameters control the size of the output volume of the convo-
lutional layer (Fig. 4): the kernel field size, the depth, stride, and zero-padding.
We will ignore zero-padding because we do not use it. The depth (D) of the
output volume controls the number of neurons in a layer that connect to the
same region of the input volume. The stride (S) controls how depth columns
around the spatial dimensions (width and height) are allocated.
The spatial size of the output volume can be computed as a function of the
input volume W , the kernel field size of the convolutional layer neurons K, and
the stride with which they are applied S. The formula for calculating how many
neurons “fit” in a given volume is given by (W −K)/S + 1.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the one-dimensional convolutional architecture
3 Related Work
Methods of analyzing malware can be divided into two types: static analysis and
dynamic analysis. We focus on static analysis as explained previously.
OfficeMalScanner [15] (OMS) is an analysis tool for document files. OMS
scans entire files for generic shellcode patterns, an embedded signature of docu-
ment files, or an embedded executable file. Although this method incorporates
fuzzy search, it is easy to avoid detection because the number of the search
patterns is small.
MDScan [16] is a standalone malicious document scanner. The tool analyzes
PDF document files individually and detects malicious code. The tool combines
static analysis of the document format representation and dynamic analysis of
the embedded script code. The method focuses only on JavaScript in PDF files.
Hence, the method does not work well when the exploit code is not written in
JavaScript.
There are several approaches to malware detection that use binary or grayscale
images (binary texture analysis [17], malware images [10], support vector ma-
chines [18] and visualization of binary files [19]). These approaches are aimed
toward the detection and the classification of malicious software based on image
processing techniques. Hence, they do not focus on finding a small amounts x86
code, such as shellcode, as we are doing here.
Binary fragment classification can visualize the location of regions of interest.
The fragment size needs as small as the size of shellcode to find it. Xu et al. [20]
treated a 1024-byte file fragment as a grayscale image and used an image classi-
fication method to classify file fragment. They focused on file type classification
for digital forensics. It is difficult to make the fragment smaller because the tex-
ture of its grayscale image becomes harder to analyze. Hence, it is difficult to
find shellcode using this method.
Table 1. Number of elements in each of our datasets
Type of dataset
Category & Source File Block Code
Program GitHub 1,147 49,577 258,793
Ubuntu 295 72,103 404,427
Total 1,442 121,680 663,220
Others CFB 27 31,779 223,904
OOXML 18 33,495 220,669
PDF 27 35,357 232,573
Total 72 100,631 677,146
Total 1,514 222,311 1,340,366
4 Training Data
We prepared two categories of dataset for training, both of which can be gathered
easily. One category is labelled “Program” and comprises various sets of x86
code taken from two sources: Github and Ubuntu 16.04. The other category
is called “Others” and consists of various document files and portions of data
extracted from them. The “Others” category contains “CFB,”“OOXML,” and
“PDF” files. CFB stands for compound file binary [21], and it is used as a
container like the FAT16 file system. CFB is used in files with the extensions
“.doc,” “.xls,” “.ppt,” “.jtd” (used by the “Ichitaro” Japanese word processor),
“.hwp” (used by the “Araea Han-geul” Korean word processor), and so on.
OOXML stands for Office Open XML [22], which is a zip container in reality.
OOXML is used in “.docx,” “.xlsx,” and “.pptx” files. PDF stands for portable
document format [23], which has the extension “.pdf.” For each category and
source or file type, we constructed there types of dataset: the whole files, 256-
byte blocks extracted from these files, and 2048-bit segments of code extracted
from the files. Table 1 shows an outline of our datasets. An outline of how to
make our datasets is shown in Fig. 5. The methods for making each of our types
of dataset are as follows.
File The following procedure is conducted for making the file dataset in the
“Program:GitHub” category.
– Gather various C/C++ source code files from GitHub [24]
– Compile these files into x86 object files by using gcc [25]
– Extract only the native code from these object files.
To make the file dataset in the “Program:Ubuntu” category, we extracted
program code from the elf files in the “/bin” and “/sbin” directories of Ubuntu
16.04 using the header information.
Finally, to make the file datasets in the “Others” category, we used a search
engine to gather various open-source document files. Table 2 shows the keywords
Fig. 5. Method for reproducing our datasets
Table 2. The keyword list for each label
keyword list
CFB “test”,“.doc”
Others OOXML “test”,“.docx”
PDF “test”,“.pdf”
used for this search. We downloaded document files from the beginning of the
list of search results. We then checked these download files using VirusTotal [26],
and we removed suspicious files that were detected as malware.
Block “Block” datasets are made by extracting 256-byte blocks by random
sampling from every file in a “File” dataset. We calculated Shannon entropy
rates (Equation (1)) for each block in the “Block” datasets. The distributions
of the entropy rates for blocks in the “Program” and “Others” categories are
shown in Fig. 6.
Code The following procedure is used to make “Code” datasets. First, we treat
the files of a “File” dataset as x86 code files, whether they come from the “Pro-
gram” category or the “Others ” category. Second, we separate these files into
“instructions” (i.e., disassemble the real or pretended x86 code). Third, we con-
vert each instruction into a 128-bit fixed-length instruction by padding it with
“0x00.” Finally, packing 16 randomly selected fixed-length instructions into one
set, we make a 2048-bit sequence. The reason we padded instructions to 128
bits (16 bytes) is the following. According to the specification of the x86 archi-
Fig. 6. Distributions of the Shannon entropy rate for blocks in the two categories of
dataset
Fig. 7. The results of disassembling a native-code or CFB file
tecture [8] 15 bytes is basically the maximum length of one instruction. Thus
we padded each instruction with null bytes to achieve a fixed length of 16 bytes
(one byte larger than the maximum instruction length) and combined 16 of these
padded instructions to form a code segment that has a convenient length for our
analysis. Although 15 bytes is the basic maximum length of instruction, longer
instructions could appear in theory (particularly when the file being interpreted
as x86 code is actually a document file). 5 However, we did not find any in-
struction longer than 15 bytes in our experiment. The results of disassembling
x86 native code and a CFB file are shown in Fig. 7. The average of the lengths
of each “instruction” is 2.95 bytes for the“ Program” category and 2.38 bytes
5 The following sentence appears in the specification.
Exceeding the instruction length limit of 15 bytes (this only can occur when
redundant prefixes are placed before an instruction).
Fig. 8. Distributions of instruction lengths in files from the “Program” and “Others”
categories. The total number of instructions in each category is over 600,000.
for the“ Others” category. As shown in the figure, there are various lengths of
instruction in x86 CPU architecture, which appear to have no regular pattern.
The frequencies of each instruction length in files from each category are shown
in Fig. 8.
5 Proposed Visualization Methods
In this section, we introduce three visualization methods: o-glasses (1d-CNN),
o-glasses (MLP), and o-glasses (entropy), which are based on a 1d-CNN, an
MLP, and entropy, respectively. These methods classify the input block as either
“Program” or “Others” and visualize the input block as an image in two colors
(“Program” is shown in red, “Others” is shown in green). Fig. 9 shows the result
of visualizing “notepad.exe” using our methods and three conventional methods.
The details of each method are as follows.
5.1 o-glasses (1d-CNN)
First, we consider the o-glasses method based on a 1d-CNN.
Local receptive field for the x86 instruction set We aim to make our
model specialize in recognition of native program code. If you directly input
binary, such as an x86 instruction set, into a convolutional layer, you cannot
identify single instructions as expected. The input data consist of instructions
serialized as one-dimensional data. We convert the input data into N-bit fixed-
length instructions to obtain features of the instructions. Additionally, the kernel
field size and the stride should be adjusted to N . We selected 128 (16 bytes) as
Fig. 9. The result of visualizing “notepad.exe.” In the case of the grayscale image,
we adopted the conventional conversion techniques [9,10] except for fixing a 128-pixel
(byte) image width. In the case of the structural entropy image, we selected 256 bytes
for the block size. Our methods classify the input block as either “Program” (red) or
“Others” (green). The block sizes are 256 in o-glasses (entropy) and o-glasses (MLP),
and 16 instructions in o-glasses( 1d-CNN). The block shifts are 1 byte in all the meth-
ods.
the value of N because this is a convenient size that is just larger than the
maximum size (15 bytes) of an x86 instruction. In the 1d-CNN, the first layer
consists of local receptive fields against each instruction. Therefore, it is expected
that the next layer obtains the relationships among instructions.
Our 1d-CNN The whole of our 1d-CNN is shown in Fig. 10. We serialize a
set of 16 fixed-length instructions into an array of 2048 bit values as input data.
The first layer is a convolutional layer (Bit-CNN). We apply 96 layers of 128
bit-filters to a 2048 input volume. Choosing a stride of 128, the output volume
is 16 × 96. The second layer is also a convolutional layer (Instruction-CNN).
We apply 256 2-filters to a 16 × 96 input volume with a stride of 1. We expect
that the second layer will obtain the features of the relationship between two
Fig. 10. Outline of our 1d-CNN
adjacent instructions. Our 1d-CNN does not contain any Pooling layer. The 3rd
to the 5th layers are fully connected. Their output volumes are 400, 400, and
2, respectively. We add two batch normalization [27] layers before the 1st and
2nd fully connected layers to speed up and stabilize the learning process. After
each layer except the last one, we apply a ReLU [28] layer. The ReLU layer
applies the function f(u) = max(u, 0) to all of the values in the input volume.
The softmax function is used in the final layer of our network.
yk ≡ z(L)k =
exp(u
(L)
k )∑K
j=1 exp(u
(L)
j )
, (2)
where K = 2 and k ∈ {1, 2}. Our network is trained under a cross-entropy
regime. The cross-entropy function for one training sample (xn,tn) for n ∈ [1, N ]
is
En(w) = −
K∑
k=1
(tnk log ynk(xn,W)
+(1− tnk) log(1− ynk(xn,W))) ,
(3)
where the input data is xn ∈ {0, 1}2048, the true label is tn ∈ {0, 1}K , and the
number of output units is K. The sum of the errors En calculated from each
training sample is the total error function E:
E(w) =
N∑
n=1
En(w), (4)
where the number of samples is N .
Stochastic gradient descent We use the stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
method to minimize the error function in the backpropagation algorithm. To
Table 3. Performance of our methods to detect x86 code
Our methods F-measure Precision Recall
Based on Entropy 0.9266 0.8725 0.9879 Range:0.408–0.753
Based on MLP 0.9840 0.9830 0.9851
Based on 1d-CNN 0.9995 0.9999 0.9992
economize on the computational cost of each iteration, SGD samples a subset of
summand functions at every step. This is very effective in the case of large-scale
machine learning problems.
The current weight wt is updated to wt+1 using the following equation.
wt+1 ← wt − η ∂E(w)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wt
, (5)
where η is the learning rate.
A compromise between computing the true gradient and the gradient of
a single example is to compute the gradient against more than one training
example (called a “mini-batch”) at each step.
Em(w) =
1
|Nm|
∑
n∈Nm
En(w), (6)
where Nm is a subset of the index set {1, . . . , N} such that ⊔mNm = {1, . . . , N}
and Nmi ∩Nmj = Ø for i 6= j.
5.2 o-glasses (MLP)
Like the previous method, this method focuses on each block of the target file.
The input data size is one block (a 256-byte sequence), and the block shift is 1
byte. The network containing hidden layers and the output layer is the same as
fully connected layers 3–5, shown in Fig. 10, for the 1d-CNN (see Section 5.1).
5.3 o-glasses (Entropy)
The method detects program code based on whether the entropy of the block lies
within a given range. When appropriate range criteria are selected, this method
achieves reasonable accuracy in the detection of program code.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Recognition Performance
We investigated the detection rates of program code by our methods using the
training datasets described in Section 4. Table 3 shows an overview of the results.
Table 4. Confusion matrix
Predicated True Condition
Condition Program Others
Program TP FP
Others FN TN
In the comparison of the different algorithms, we use the F-measure defined
by
Fmeasure =
2 · Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall
. (7)
In this calculation, precision is given by
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (8)
and recall is given by
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (9)
where TP is the true positive rate, FP is the false positive rate, FN is the false
negative rate, and TN is the true negative rate (see Table 4).
o-glasses (Entropy) We examined many ranges for the entropy rate-based
binary classifier and chose the range that gives the maximum F-measure for the
training dataset. The F-measure for entropy in Table 3 was calculated using this
“range” parameter (also shown in the table) against the test dataset.
o-glasses (MLP) and o-glasses (1d-CNN) To train and test our network,
10-fold cross-validation was used. After 200 epochs, we calculated the F-measure,
the precision, and the recall of the test data.
Here is our parameter configuration:
– learning rate(η) = 0.001
– mini-batch size = 100
The learning curves of the error are shown in Figs. 11 and 12. The blue
areas indicate the range of possible values of the training errors in the 10-fold
cross-validation process. The solid blue lines indicate the average of the training
errors in the 10-fold cross-validation process. The red areas indicate the range of
possible values of the test errors in the 10-fold cross-validation process. The solid
red lines indicate the average of the test errors in the 10-fold cross-validation
process. From this figure, it can be seen that our 1d-CNN method does not cause
over-fitting.
Fig. 11. Learning curve of o-glasses (MLP) Fig. 12. Learning curve of o-glasses (1d-
CNN)
6.2 Experiments with Malicious Documents
In this section, we visualize three malicious document files to discuss the effec-
tiveness of our methods. The first malicious document file contains 127 bytes of
x86 code. The second malicious document file contains 29 bytes of x86 code. The
third malicious document file does not use vulnerabilities, and does not have any
x86 code. These files are referred to in the following discussion as File 1, File 2,
and File 3, respectively.
The parameters used in these experiments are the same as those described
in the previous section. After 200 epochs of training using all our datasets, we
visualized the three files.
File 1: CVE-2014-7247 File 1 contains a compressed executable. If we can
analyze the file dynamically, it is easy to output the executable. However, this file
is a .jtd document file for Ichitaro, which is Japanese word processing software
similar to Microsoft Word. The old version of Ichitaro had a vulnerability called
CVE-2014-7247, which this document targets. So, we need the old version for
dynamic analysis. When we do not have the old version, we must find the decoder
for the executable file to output it. Therefore, we need to find the shellcode.
This document file contains 127 bytes of x86 code. The code is split two
sequences; the size of the first sequence is 77bytes, and the size of the second
sequence is 50 bytes. The first sequence codes for jumping to the second sequence.
Fig. 13 shows the result of visualizing File 1. The o-glasses (1d-CNN) method
shows an x86 code sequence at almost the same location as the first sequence.
However, the method could not locate the second sequence.
File 2: CVE-2012-0158 File 2 contains an executable file encoded with a 2-
byte-key xor. This document file is a Word (.doc) document file and attacks a
vulnerability called CVE-2012-0158. This document file contains only 29 bytes
of x86 code. This is the code which we mentioned in the Introduction. Fig. 14
Fig. 13. Results of visualizing File 1 by various methods
shows the results of visualizing File 2. The o-glasses (1d-CNN) method could not
locate the decoder. However, it found a sequence of “nop” instructions located
just before the decoder.
File 3: VBA script donwloader Unlike the other two files, File 3 does not
contain any executable file. Additionally, this document file does not attack
any vulnerabilities. Instead, a VBA script in this document file downloads an
executable file from the internet and runs it. Therefore, this document file does
not contain any x86 code. As shown in Fig. 15, o-glasses (1d-CNN) correctly
reports no x86 code in this document, while the other methods report many false-
positive blocks. Thus, human examiners can confidently focus on the positive
blocks reported by o-glasses (1d-CNN) to search for real shellcode in malicious
documents.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the usage and limitations of our methods, and areas
for future work.
Easily Collectible Training Datasets One of the most significant problems
using machine learning is how to prepare the training dataset. Even an excel-
lent model cannot demonstrate its performance without large samples. Many
Fig. 14. Results of visualizing File 2 using various methods
studies of malware using machine learning have sometimes struggled to collect
samples because they need hard-to-collect malware. In contrast, our approach
does not need malware for the training dataset. Since all we need to collect is
x86 code and normal document files, it possible for anyone to create training
datasets from easily accessible sources. Surprisingly, in spite of this fact, our
method, o-glasses(1d-CNN), can find the locations of shellcode almost exactly.
Therefore, our proposed methods suggest a possible beneficial effect for profes-
sional malware analysis. On the other hand, some shellcode is known to contain
garbage code. We did not consider such cases, and therefore our dataset needs
to be improved.
Fig. 15. Results of visualizing File 3 by various methods
High Recognition Rate for x86 Code In this paper, we have presented a
method of recognizing program code in document files using a 1d-CNN. Using a
local receptive field and weight sharing, our 1d-CNN can capture important fea-
tures of instructions. Thus, even if the input instruction sequence is shifted, our
network can recognize program code with a high degree of success, as measured
by the F-measure rate.
The result of our experiments, inputting 16 opcodes into our network, is that
the F-measure rate reaches about 99.95%. While this value seems to be very
high at first glance, it means that, when the target file size is 100 KB, about 50
bytes of noise is generated in the visualization result. When looking for a small
program like shellcode, this noise becomes an obstacle to analysis. Although our
method has already achieved a real-use level of performance for human analysts,
it still needs further improvement for automatic shellcode detection.
Visual Analysis to Support Analysts In this paper, we visualized several
malicious document files and showed that we could find some small programs like
shellcode. Furthermore, in the case of a document file which does not contain
any x86 native code, other methods do not provide convincing evidence that
x86 native code was not present. But, by using our method, we can be fairly
confident that a file does not contain x86 native code.
However, some malicious document files do not contain x86 native code, but
contain interpreted code such as JavaScript. Our methods do not cover such
files. For these files, it is necessary to analyze the malware by another method,
which may be combined with our o-glasses (1d-CNN) method.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a 1d-CNN for detecting program code in document
files. We observed that a local receptive field for a 128-bit fixed-length instruction
is effectively formed in the first layer of our network. We can balance both high
precision rate and high recall rate for detecting program code by using our
network. Our network can narrow down a target for human static analysis of
unknown malware. Future work includes increasing the number of malicious
document files used to check the validity of our proposed method. Another task
is to combine our network with various analysis methods for unknown malware.
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